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Epstein’s Razor
David G. Owen∗




Richard Epstein, over a long and distinguished career, has offered inspired insights into how a
legal system should be framed to serve the goals of those it governs. In that pursuit, he has relent-
lessly applied a sharp logic — call it Epstein’s Razor — to shave away the detritus of complexity
and confusion that surround perplexing problems, leaving standing only truths unscathed by com-
petition among ideas. Over decades of diverse writings on law and political theory, highlighted
by his elegant Simple Rules for a Complex World, Professor Epstein offers a vision of law con-
structed on the view that simplicity in law is good — that legal rules have become too numerous
and complex and that, if law were set more firmly on elemental principles, the planet would be a
better place to live.
∗David G. Owen, Carolina Distinguished Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
More than half a millennium in the past, when scholars mostly worked in 
monasteries, William of Ockham, a Franciscan friar who lived in England (c. 
1285–1349), announced pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate—“plurality 
ought not be posited without necessity” —meaning that the simplest explanation 
usually is best.  This idea, sometimes called “the law of economy” (or of 
“parsimony,” lex parsimoniae) is traceable to Aristotle and endorsed by, among 
others, Thomas Aquinas and Isaac Newton.  In the words of Aquinas: “If a thing 
can be done adequately by means of one, it is superfluous to do it by means of 
several; for we observe that nature does not employ two instruments where one 
suffices.”  In 1852, Sir William Hamilton, 9th Baronet of Preston, dubbed this 
concept Ockham’s Razor, and the moniker has stuck.1 
I 
Richard Epstein may not work in a monastery, but “the law of economy” fits his 
view of law like a glove.  In a masterful opus that extends far beyond the law of 
torts, Simple Rules for a Complex World,2 Professor Epstein offers a vision of law 
constructed on the view that simplicity in law is good, and that simplicity in fact 
frames many aspects of law as it has evolved, and as it might better be conceived.  
With inspired insight yet elegant simplicity, Epstein argues that legal rules have 
become too numerous and complex, and that if law were set more firmly on 
simple principles, and if it were comprised of fewer and simpler rules, the planet 
would be a better place to live.  Call this Epstein’s Razor. 
In a world where people chase limited resources, the goals of fewer and 
simpler rules proceed from a few simple premises: (1) that law should promote 
the freedom of human beings, “autonomy”; (2) that freedom is enhanced by 
maximizing resources, and resources are maximized by allowing a broad domain 
of conduct governed by self-interest rather than by other-regarding norms; (3) that 
rules should foster, not frustrate, human efforts and aspirations; (4) that simple 
rules are preferable to those that are complex (rules that are dense, technical, 
multi-sourced, and indeterminate); (5) that complex rules are administratively 
expensive—to understand, comply with, and enforce—and so drain the limited 
resource pool; and (6) that complex rules are acceptable only when they better 
serve the first premise—promoting freedom.3  Revealing the virtues of simplicity, 
Epstein’s premises are elemental and largely irrefutable. 
                                                
1 Adhering to this precept, I direct readers for authority to Occam’s Razor, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam’s_razor. 
2 Harvard University Press, 1995. 
3 See id. ch. 1. 
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Notwithstanding its essential virtues, simplicity has some enemies.4  First 
is “perfect justice,” which, Epstein reminds us, is a legal iteration of an ideal that 
easily falls prey to the familiar maxim that the perfect is the enemy of the good.  
Obsessive efforts to achieve perfect justice in every case, rather than rough justice 
in most cases, multiply the complexity of rules—which results in better justice in 
some instances, but at a price that often is too high.  Though increasing the 
freedom of persons whose legal outcomes detailed rules convert from wrong to 
right, such rules decrease the freedom of all persons who now must live in a more 
complicated regime.  And, not infrequently, the latter decreased freedom is 
greater than the freedom saved by the effort to move justice toward perfection. 
Another enemy of simplicity, Epstein explains, springs from efforts to 
apply the types of complex rules that govern families and other kinds of intimate 
groups to large-group situations involving strangers.  In family and other small-
group settings, behavioral norms reflect a multitude of differing talents, resources, 
preferences, and expectations of the individual members of particular groups.  
When people move norm-setting principles from groups that are small to those 
that are large (as in the world of strangers we all inhabit), the nuanced set of 
norms that operate so well (often implicitly) in small groups fit awkwardly at best.  
Because people operating in large groups do not have the same levels of 
information about and trust in other members that prevail in small-group settings, 
norms for large groups must be framed as formal legal rules with operating 
principles that are fewer, less individualized, and less complex. 
Before examining how Professor Epstein’s simple-rule construct applies to 
tort law problems, we might note how tort law fits broadly within his “libertarian 
synthesis” of simple principles for organizing a complex world: “First apply the 
property rules of self-ownership and first possession; next apply the general rules 
of contract with respect to the endowments so acquired; and afterward apply the 
tort laws to see that no impermissible actions of aggression took place.”5 More 
fully, he explains that: (1) people have a natural right to “self-ownership”—
individual freedom or autonomy; (2) people have an inherent right to acquire 
resources6 and put them to uses they deem best—freedom of property; (3) people 
can maximize their personal welfare through voluntary exchanges of resources for 
mutual gain—freedom of contract; and (4) since all people have an equal right to 
freedom, they may not use force or deceit to infringe on the freedom interests of 
others—infringements rectified by the law of torts.  Together, these principles 
                                                
4 See id. ch. 2.  In the spirit of Ockham’s Razor, I direct readers for authority hereafter to 
Professor Epstein’s book, which I shall henceforth cite only for quotations. 
5 Id. at 72. 
6 “[Y]ou take what you can get.”  Id. at 59. 
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“describe a world with strong and well-defined rights in persons and property, 
complete freedom of exchange, and powerful protection against external threats.”7 
II 
Now that we have an outline of Richard Epstein’s fundamental principles, we are 
equipped to examine how Epstein’s Razor informs a few particularized rules of 
tort. What this inquiry reveals is that the razor is sharpest—and, hence, operates 
most effectively—when rules are clear and reflect commonly-understood 
communal norms. More simply, Epstein’s Razor explains and improves the law of 
torts. 
Comparative Negligence.  For many years, Professor Epstein has explored how 
tort law should apportion accidental losses among wrongdoers, notably between a 
negligent defendant and a negligent plaintiff but also between multiple 
defendants.  On this issue, he long has advocated that damages be apportioned 
equally (“pro rata”) between all parties responsible for an accident.  So, if one 
driver runs a red light, another is intoxicated and fails to maintain a proper 
lookout, and a collision thereby ensures, both drivers should split the resulting 
damages 50–50.  If three negligent drivers together cause a collision, they should 
split the damages evenly, three ways.  Although contrary to prevailing law, 
Epstein’s equal-division rule for damages apportionment draws from hoary legal 
precedent (such as traditional admiralty law), and the pro rata principle still is 
sound. So long as the negligence of each actor (say three) is a substantial and 
proximate cause of a collision, it seems that none should be allowed to gamble on 
coming out at the right end of a finely-tailored division of the damages—say, 
28%, 37%, and 35%—but that each should simply be required to pay an equal 
share.  In addition to being easy to understand and cheap to administer, such a 
simple and fundamentally fair (if “imperfect”) approach to apportionment should 
decrease gaming and increase settlements, for it avoids asking jurors to formulate 
divisions that reflect the advocacy skills of counsel more than any “true” divisions 
of metaphysical responsibility. 
Negligence.  While Epstein’s view on apportionment illuminates the value of his 
system of simple rules for accident law, his argument that strict liability is 
                                                
7 Id. at 110. While this libertarian synthesis of principles sets the stage for a world of ordered 
liberty, Epstein explains that this set of principles must be tempered by two others that cut the 
other way, both of which are captured by his adage of “take and pay”—first, a limited privilege of 
private necessity, actuated by “imminent peril to life or to property”; and, second, a police-power 
principle of eminent domain, allowing government to take private property to benefit the 
community, on paying the owner just compensation.  Id. at 113, 128. 
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preferable to negligence is more difficult to accept.  While acknowledging that the 
Hand calculus for determining due care and negligence fairly reflects a Golden 
Rule approach that dates at least to Roman times (a norm requiring people “to 
take the same level of care with the affairs of others that you would bring to your 
own affairs”),8 he argues that informational and psychological frailties that 
frustrate rational decisionmaking, combined with the indeterminacy of cost-
benefit evaluations of untaken precautions, support a general rule of strict liability 
for causing harm.  While Epstein’s arguments for strict liability are firmly 
grounded in simplicity, minimizing costs, determinacy, and respect for equal 
freedom, I agree with most observers that a better default rule for accident law, if 
admittedly more complex, is fault—because, quite simply, it allows for a greater 
sphere of freedom.9 
Landowner Liability to Entrants.  The common law conventionally determined a 
landowner’s duty of care toward entrants based on whether the entrant was a 
trespasser, licensee, or invitee.  Under this scheme, landowners did not have to 
provide safety for trespassers whose presence was not anticipated, reflecting 
Epstein’s simple rule of property; and a landowner’s duty to licensees (reflecting 
their equal right to freedom) normally was only to warn them of hidden dangers.  
Toward invitees drawn onto commercial premises for business purposes, 
however, landowners (being engaged with invitees in mutual exchange) had a 
duty of reasonable care to warn them of hidden dangers and, often more 
importantly, to put the premises in a reasonably safe condition.  More recently, of 
course, the trend has been to abolish these traditional categories in favor of a 
single standard of reasonable care to entrants of most types, an approach 
Professor Epstein accepts as a workable proxy for the traditional classification 
scheme. Ultimately, however, Epstein justifiably opts for the traditional 
approach—on grounds of lower cost, better results, and because the categorical 
approach captures common mores more closely than a uniform standard of 
reasonable care, a standard that may be simpler to state but is conceptually and 
administratively more complex.10 
Punitive Damages.  A final tort law issue, on which Richard Epstein 
uncharacteristically has said little, is punitive damages—in particular, on the 
                                                
8 Id. at 94. 
9 See David G. Owen, Philosophical Foundations of Fault in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 201 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 
GA. L. REV. 703 (1992). 
10 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 12.11 (1999). 
4
Journal of Tort Law, Vol. 3 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 2
method by which the amount of such awards should be determined.11  
Traditionally, once a jury decides that a defendant’s flagrant misconduct warrants 
punitive damages, it then determines a proper amount for such damages by 
considering three factors: “the character of the defendant’s act [reprehensibility], 
the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff which the defendant caused or 
intended to cause, and the wealth of the defendant.”12  More recently, the United 
States Supreme Court, searching for a way to limit excessive awards of punitive 
damages under the due process clause, has hinted that some multiple of 
compensatory damages (drawing from the second conventional measurement 
factor) might appropriately cap the amount of such awards.  Because of the 
variety of purposes served by punitive damages, most commentators have 
shunned this simple-multiple approach as a clumsy method for ascertaining how 
much civil punishment should be assessed in specific cases of flagrantly inflicted 
harm. 
Perhaps Epstein’s reluctance to engage this provocative issue more fully 
reflects his being tugged in different directions between two strong impulses, two 
differing “rules of economy”: a rule of optimal deterrence, using the particular 
malefactor’s likelihood of detection to generate a particular multiple of 
compensatory damages applicable in particular circumstances; or, a rule that 
simply assigns a predetermined multiple—like treble damages—in every case, an 
approach that promotes deterrence (and restitution), if only roughly.  In view of 
Professor Epstein’s paucity of analysis on which of these two rules of economy 
should control this vexing question, we might turn to a tool of decision he has 
handed us already: Epstein’s Razor.  And with this sharp instrument, the correct 
approach is clear: treble damages, or some other predetermined multiple.13  Apart 
from its grounding across many civilizations over the millennia, and over many 
centuries of Anglo-American law, a predetermined multiple-damages approach is 
far simpler and less expensive than the particularized optimal-deterrence rule; and 
it has the added benefit of trimming the Supreme Court out of tort law’s hair, 
which the optimal deterrence rule may not.  Moreover, at least in cases involving 
serious harm, a simple-multiple method serves roughly to cover all a victim’s 
losses resulting from a flagrant wrong, a vital restitutionary function of this 
special type of remedy in private law.14 
                                                
11 The only source for Epstein’s views on this topic that I could find is RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 190 (1980).  He there briefly notes his preference for 
retribution over deterrence as a rationale for such damages, and for a double damages rule in 
certain situations. 
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2). 
13 Double damages are, indeed, what Epstein long ago suggested, if only as a casual aside.  
See supra note 11. 





Over a long and distinguished career, Richard Epstein has investigated how tort 
principles fit in a legal system designed to serve the fundamental goals of the 
people it governs.  In that pursuit, he has relentlessly applied his razor, shaving 
away the detritus of complexity and confusion, leaving only those truths that 
remain unscathed by competition among ideas.  Always, he has reminded us to 
stay grounded in common sense, and grounded in the fundamentals—especially in 
tort law’s foundational role in setting a behavioral structure by which humans can 
live peaceably together while competing for resources in a world of scarcity.  Tort 
law accomplishes this objective by “enforc[ing] the separate domains in which all 
of us, singly, can live our own lives as we see fit.”15  Libertarian elegance, at its 
best, said so simply because it has nothing to hide, but rests on truth. 
                                                
15 EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 92. 
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